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Abstract
We analyze the monopolist’s decision about how to design diﬀerent versions of a good, i.e. whether
to make them substitutes or complements, when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this con-
text, we ﬁnd that versioning goods as substitutes or complements may be optimal for the monopolist,
and the ﬁnal result depends on the degree of concavity and convexity of the cost function.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A common strategy for most ﬁrms is to create various versions of the same product (which is known as
versioning goods) for price discriminating purposes and to increase proﬁts, particularly in the industry
of information goods (Belleﬂamme (2005)). Nevertheless, we believe that this strategy is not used to the
full by some ﬁrms insofar as they only pay attention to introducing a new low-quality variant (or version)
onto the market and fail to consider the possibility of making complementary or substitute variants
so that consumers can buy them simultaneously. We refer to this possibility or strategy as versioning
substitute/complementary goods.
To understand the strategy of versioning substitute/complementary goods better, we give three exam-
ples of the implementation of this strategy in the media, software and textile industries. We ﬁrst consider
a press market with two diﬀerentiated newspapers sold by a single publishing house (or multiproduct
monopolist), where the source of diﬀerentiation is the size of the readership, as in Gabszewicz, Laussel
and Sonnac (2001). Imaging that a general interest newspaper and an economic newspaper report on an
economic news item. Then the publishing house designs both newspapers so that a consumer can read
this news item in both newspapers or in only one (general or economic).
Secondly we consider a monopolist that develops two vertically diﬀerentiated versions of a software
product, in which quality is denoted by the number of applications that they can run (Deneckere and
McAfee (1996) and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003)). For instance, assume that the monopolist makes a
low-quality variant a little more attractive at ﬁrst sight than the high-end version, so that a consumer
of the latter version must buy the low-end version if he wants a better appearance. Thus, he encourages
consumers to buy both variants.
F i n a l l yw ef o c u so nw o m e n ’ sd e c i s i o n sa st ow h a tq u a l i t y - d i ﬀerentiated new dresses to buy, where
they can be substitutes if they are similar in style and colours, or complementary if they are in diﬀerent
colours, for instance. It is possible that a woman may value two complementary dresses more because she
can choose between them and combine each with diﬀerent shoes, clothes and jewellery, so that she seems
to have an extensive wardrobe (Gabszewicz, Sonnac and Wauthy (2001)). In this market, a monopolist
can take this into account when it comes to designing a product line. As we can note in the last two
examples, complementarity can be seen as a source of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
Versioning goods (or equivalently second degree price discrimination) has previously been analyzed
from a theoretical viewpoint. In a seminal 1979 paper, Stokey provides conditions under which (second
degree) price discrimination is not optimal. In a later study Salant (1989) shows that price discrimination
is not optimal if the marginal cost function of improving quality is linear. However, under these conditions,
Jing (2007) shows that the presence of network externalities restores the optimality of price discrimination
(or versioning goods).
A special strategy of versioning goods consists of damaging a high-quality good because this is a
cheaper way of producing a low-quality good than actually making a low-quality good. This particular
strategy has been analyzed by Deneckere and McAfee (1996), who provide many examples of it in the
2chemicals, electronics and pharmaceutical industries, and show that it can be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm and a
Pareto improvement.
In a simple model of versioning information goods, Belleﬂamme (2005) shows that if the common
valuation of diﬀerent variants by consumers is zero and the constant marginal cost of producing one unit
is the same for any variant, the monopolist will not prefer to version goods. In other words, it will oﬀer
the high-quality variant only.
In a recent paper Bhargava and Choudhary (in press) show that if the marginal cost of manufacturing
is invariant in quality, versioning is optimal when the optimal market share of the lower-quality version
oﬀered alone is greater than the optimal market share of the high-quality version oﬀered alone.
These papers fail to take into account that consumers may simultaneously buy low- and high-quality
versions of a good. This has been analyzed in a duopoly model of vertical diﬀerentiation by Gabszewicz,
Sonnac and Wauthy (2001) for complementary variants and by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003) for sub-
stitutes. These authors call this possibility a joint purchase option.
In the present paper, we develop a monopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentiation for analyzing
the monopolist’s decision about the possibility of versioning goods as substitutes or complements when
the joint purchase option is available to consumers. In this context, we ﬁnd that versioning goods as
substitutes or complements is optimal for the monopolist, and the ﬁnal result depends on the degree of
concavity and convexity of the cost function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model formally. The monopolist’s
decision about how to design diﬀerent variants of a good is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes
equilibrium strategies and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a monopolist who decides whether to produce one or two variants of a product. The
two variants are vertically diﬀerentiated as per Mussa and Rosen (1978), so there is a variant of high
quality, indexed by uh, and other of low quality, indexed by ul.T h u s , uh >u l. We assume that the
monopolist produces at zero cost. He chooses the prices of the variants and the degree of substitution
and complementarity between them so as to maximize proﬁts.
Unlike previous models that analyze versioning strategies, in this paper we allow consumers to simul-
taneously buy the two variants of a product. This possibility can be viewed as consuming a third variant
of quality u2. Consumers are indexed by θ ∈ [0,1] which represents consumers’ tastes for the quality of
a product. We assume that θ follows a uniform distribution. The utility of consumer θ is:
3U (θ,ul,u h,u 2,p l,p h)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
θuh − ph if he/she buys the high-quality variant
θul − pl if he/she buys the low-quality variant
θu2 − ph − pl if he/she buys both variants (or the “bundle”)
0 if he/she does not buy
(1)
where pl and ph are the price of the low- and high-quality variants, respectively. In order to ﬁnd
the monopolist’s demand function, we consider two cases: (i) u2 ∈ ]uh,u l + uh[ if the two variants are
substitutes, and (ii) u2 ∈ [ul + uh,+∞[ if they are complementary.1
(i) Substitutes (u2 ∈ ]uh,u l + uh[) Let θl be a consumer indiﬀerent between buying the low-
quality variant and not buying at all, from function (1), θl = pl/ul.L e t θh be a consumer indiﬀerent
between buying the high-quality variant and not buying at all, that is, θh = ph/uh.L e tθ2 be a consumer
indiﬀerent between buying the bundle and not buying at all, that is, θ2 =( pl + ph)/u2.L e t θhl be a
consumer indiﬀerent between buying the high and low-quality variants, that is, θhl =( ph −pl)/(uh−ul).
Let θ2l be a consumer indiﬀerent between buying the low-quality variant and one unit of both variants
(bundle), that is, θ2l = ph/(u2 − ul).L e tθ2h be a consumer indiﬀerent between buying the high-quality
variant and one unit of both variants (bundle), that is, θ2h = pl/(u2 − uh).
From these deﬁnitions, we derive the monopolist’s demand functions for each variant. But ﬁrst we
identify the critical regions of the domain of (pl,p h)-prices, which are shown in Figure 1(a) and coincide
with those computed by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003). The region (or subdomain) P1 is deﬁned as
P1 = {(pl,p h):pl ≥ u2 − uh}
In this region the consumer who is most willing to pay to consume both variants (θ =1 ) prefers the
high-quality variant alone to buying them at that price. Thus, the demand function of each variant is the
same one that we obtain in a model of vertical diﬀerentiation in which buying the bundle is not possible,
so the demand functions are as follows:
Dl (pl,p h)=θhl − θl;Dh (pl,p h)=1− θhl.( 2 )
Region P2 is deﬁned by
P2 =
½






θhl ≤ θh ≤ min{θl,θ2l} ≤ max{θl,θ2l} <θ 2h.
Thus, the demands are as follows2
Dl (pl,p h)=1− θ2h;Dh (pl,p h)=1− θh.( 3 )
1See Gabszewicz, Sonnac and Wauthy (2001) and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003) for a detailed analysis of demand
functions of complementary and substitute variants of the same product in a duopoly model of vertical diﬀerentiation,
respectively.












































Figure 1: Partition of the price region
Notice that in P2 all consumers who buy low-quality variant also buy the high-quality variant, so
there are some consumers who only buy variant h. Thus the demand for variant h coincides with the
monopoly’s demand when it is oﬀered alone. Region P3 is deﬁned as follows
P3 =
½
(pl,p h):pl <u 2 − uh;ph
u2 − uh
u2 − ul






θl ≤ θh ≤ θhl ≤ θ2l ≤ θ2h.( 4 )
Thus, demands are as follows3
Dl (pl,p h)=1− θ2h + θhl − θl =1+
ph
uh − ul
− plK;Dh (pl,p h)=1− θhl,( 5 )
where
K =
ul (u2 − ul)+( uh − ul)(u2 − uh)
ul (uh − ul)(u2 − uh)
.
In this region, there are consumers who only buy the low- or high-quality variant. Finally, region P4,
which is symmetric to P2,i sd e ﬁned as follows
P4 =
½






θl < min{θ2h,θ h} ≤ max{θ2h,θ h} ≤ θ2l ≤ θhl.
Thus, the demands are as follows4
Dl (pl,p h)=1− θl;Dh (pl,p h)=1− θ2l.( 6 )
3Notice that θ2 >θ l.
4Notice that θ2 >θ l.
5(ii) Complementary variants (u2 ∈ [ul + uh,+∞[) We now describe the monopolist’s demand
function when the two variants are complementary. Thus, we take into account only the indiﬀerent
consumers θl,θh and θ2, described above. Three critical regions of the domain of (pl,p h)-prices are
identiﬁed, which are shown in Figure 1(b) and coincide with those computed by Gabszewicz, Sonnac and
Wauthy (2001). The region (or subdomain) P5 is deﬁned as follows
P5 =
½






θh ≤ θ2 ≤ θl.( 7 )
Thus, the demand for each variant is as follows
Dl (pl,p h)=1− θ2;Dh (pl,p h)=1− θh.( 8 )













Thus, the demand for each variant is as follows
Dl (pl,p h)=Dh (pl,p h)=1− θ2.( 9 )
In this region, ﬁrms’ demand coincides with the demand for the bundle (the purchase of the two
variants). Finally, region P7 is symmetric to region P5, so it is described as follows
P7 =
½






θl ≤ θ2 ≤ θh.
Thus, the demand for each variant is as follows
Dl (pl,p h)=1− θl;Dh (pl,p h)=1− θ2. (10)
The monopolist’s proﬁti sa sf o l l o w s
π(ul,u h,u 2,p l,p h)=plDl (pl,p h)+phDh (pl,p h) − C (u2) (11)
where Dl (.) and Dh (.) represent the demand for the low- and high-quality variants, respectively,
and C (u2) represents the ﬁxed cost of making variants less close substitutes or more complementary,
so that C0 (u2) > 0.5 Notice that a lower (higher) u2 implies that variants are closer substitutes (more
complementary).
5This cost function is in line with the cost function of quality-improvement considered by Motta (1993).
6The timing of the complete information game is as follows. First, the monopolist decides the rela-
tionship between the high- and low-quality variants, i.e. it decides the values of u2.N e x ti ts e t st h ep r i c e
of each variant. Finally, consumers decide to buy the high-quality variant, the low-quality variant, the
bundle or neither after they have observed the prices of the variants.
In the next section, we look for the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we seek to ﬁnd the monopolist’s equilibrium strategy, which consists of a choice about
the degree of relationship between the high- and low-quality variants (substitutes or complements) and
about the prices of the variants. To that end, in the next two subsections we look for the optimal price
strategy when the two variants are substitutes and complements, respectively. Then we seek the optimal
degree of relationship between them.
3.1 Substitution
We now obtain the optimal price strategy for the regions P1,P 2,P 3 and P4, as described above. The
monopolist, in region P3, faces the demands (5), so that by maximizing the monopolist’s proﬁt function
(11), we have that the optimal prices, demands and proﬁta r e :
p∗















3 ∈ P3 and the market is not completely covered. The demand functions that the
monopolist faces in region P2 are (3), so that the optimal prices are p∗
2 =( pl,p h)=( ( u2 − uh)/2,u h/2).
Notice that p∗
2 / ∈ P2, so the best strategy lies at the frontier with P3, which by continuity is itself
dominated by the best strategy in the interior of P3. Thus, the optimal strategy is not in region P2.
Given that region P4 is symmetric to region P2, we obtain that nor is the optimal strategy in region P4.
In region P1, the monopolist faces the demand functions (2), so we have that if u2 ≤ uh + ul/2,
optimal prices, demands and proﬁta r e :
p∗






l =0 ; D∗1
h = 1
2; π∗1 = uh
4 ; (13)
Notice that p∗
1 ∈ P1 if u2 ≤ uh +ul/2,o t h e r w i s ep∗
1 / ∈ P1. So in the last case the best strategy lies at the
frontier with P2, P3 and P4, which by continuity and the result obtained before is itself dominated by
the best strategy in the interior of P3. Thus, in this region we obtain that the optimal strategy for the
monopolist is to sell the high-quality variant only if u2 is low enough. This is the standard result obtained
by the previous studies of versioning goods or second-degree price discrimination (Stokey (1979), Salant
(1989) and Belleﬂamme (2005)). Therefore, the optimal price strategy is in region P3 if u2 ≥ uh + ul/2.
7Nevertheless, when u2 ≤ uh + ul/2, the optimal price strategy is in regions P1 or P3.B yc o m p a r i n g
π∗1 and π∗3 we get the optimal strategy for the monopolist, which is p∗
1 if u2 ≤ uh + ul/3,o t h e r w i s e
it is p∗
3. This means that versioning products as substitutes is not optimal when they are very close
substitutes, i.e. when the utility associated with the joint purchase option is low enough. These results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If the two variants are substitutes and consumers can buy them simultaneously, the mo-





1 if u2 ≤ uh + ul/3,
p∗
3 if u2 ≥ uh + ul/3,
From Proposition 1, we observe that the monopolist versions a product if u2 is high enough. Otherwise
it does not oﬀer consumers a low-quality variant.
3.2 Complementarity
In this subsection, we consider that variants are complementary, so the partition of the domain of prices
is as drawn in Figure 1(b). In region P5, the monopolist’s demand functions are (8), so the optimal

















5 ∈ P5. The demands that the monopolist faces in region P6 are (9). Since the bundle
is considered as a third good, the ﬁrm behaves as a monopolist that only sells that good, so that the
optimal prices p∗




2 .6 Thus, the demand and proﬁt correspond
to those in a monopoly, i.e. D∗6
2 =1 /2 and π∗6 = u2/4. Finally, we consider region P7,i nw h i c ht h e


















7 ∈ P7. By comparing the proﬁts obtained in regions P5, P6 and P7,w eh a v eπ∗6 <
π∗7 <π ∗5. Thus, when variants are complementary and consumers can simultaneously buy both variants,
the monopolist’s optimal price is p∗5, which means that versioning products is also optimal in this case.
This result is shown in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If the two variants are complementary and consumers can buy them simultaneously, the
monopolist sells both at prices p∗
c = p∗
5.
3.3 Substitute or Complementary Variants
In this subsection, taking into account the previous results, we seek to establish the monopolist’s optimal
choice about the degree of substitution or complementarity. The monopolist faces the following proﬁt








4 − C (u2) if uh <u 2 ≤ uh + ul/3;
u2(uh+3ul)−(uh+ul)2
4(u2+ul−uh) − C (u2) if uh + ul/3 ≤ u2 <u l + uh;a n d
u2
2
4u2−uh − C (u2) if u2 ≥ ul + uh.
(16)
By maximizing this proﬁt function on u2,w eﬁnd the equilibrium degree of substitution or comple-
mentarity. In particular, we ﬁnd two equilibrium candidates: one where the two variants are substitutes
(us
2) and another where they are complementary (uc
2). Given the assumptions in the model developed
here, we cannot obtain the explicit expression of u2, but we can provide conditions that allow us to
select the equilibrium. Namely, as we show in Proposition 3, when the cost function of making variants
complementary is slightly concave or convex, the only equilibrium possible is for the two variants to be
substitutes; and if the cost function is convex enough, we cannot select between the two candidates.
Proposition 3 When a monopolist can version substitute/complementary goods and the joint purchase
option is available to consumers, we have that







,t h e r ei sn oe q u i l i b r i u m ;















2 c a nb ea ne q u i l i b r i u m .








−C0 (u2)=0 if uh <u 2 ≤ uh + ul/3;
u2
l
(u2+ul−uh)2 − C0 (u2)=0 if uh + ul/3 ≤ u2 <u l + uh;a n d
2u2(2u2−uh)
(4u2−uh)2 − C0 (u2)=0 if u2 ≥ ul + uh.
(17)
From the FOC, given that C0 (u2) > 0,w eﬁnd the implicit expressions that deﬁne the equilibrium degrees
of substitution and complementarity and that us












(u2+ul−uh)3 − C00 (u2) ≤ 0 if uh + ul/3 ≤ u2 <u l + uh;a n d
2u2
h
(4u2−uh)3 − C00 (u2) ≤ 0 if u2 ≥ ul + uh.
(18)
We can easily check that,








,t h e r ei sn oe q u i l i b r i u m ;










, the only equilibrium candidate that satisﬁes SOC is us
2;
(c) otherwise, the two candidates satisfy SOC, so that us
2 and uc





































no effect low variant’s
expansion
no effect
Figure 2: Eﬀect of versioning substitute-complementary goods
4 Analysis of Equilibrium







where superscripts s and c represent the equilibrium when the variants are substitutes and complements,
respectively. From (19), we observe that the monopolist sells the low-quality variant more when it is a
substitute for the high-quality variant.
Let θ
1
h =1 /2 be a the consumer indiﬀerent between buying the high-quality variant and not buying
at all when the monopolist decides to oﬀer the high-quality variant only. From relationship (4) and the





















Therefore, from relationships (20) and (21), we show that there is no cannibalization eﬀect.7 This explains
why versioning substitute/complementary goods is optimal when the joint purchase option is available
to consumers. This last result is summarized in Proposition 4 and illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 4 If a monopolist can version substitute/complementary goods and consumers can simul-
taneously buy the two versions, there is no cannibalization eﬀect.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the expansion eﬀect is felt only in variant l when the two variants are




2 be the equilibrium degree of substitution and complementarity, respectively. Since we
do not know the explicit expression of us∗
2 and uc∗
2 , we cannot make a complete analysis of equilibrium,
7The cannabalization eﬀect represents the fact that there are consumers who would buy the high-quality variant if it
were the only one available, but who would buy the low-quality variant otherwise.
10but we can ﬁnd how these equilibria change as the two variants diﬀer more in quality. Notice that a
higher us∗
2 implies that variants are less close substitutes, and a higher uc∗
2 implies that they are more
complementary. Through the theorem of implicit function, we obtain that a higher quality of the high-
quality variant implies, ceteris paribus (which is equivalent to a higher diﬀerentiation), that variants
are less close substitutes and less complementary. Intuitively, this means that when the diﬀerentiation
between variants increases, the monopolist will seek to boost joint purchase if variants are substitutes,
and seek to save costs if variants are complementary. The result is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In any SPE, a higher diﬀerentiation implies lower substitution if variants are substitutes,
and lower complementarity if they are complementary.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Let
F (ul,u h,u 2)=
u2
l
(u2 + ul − uh)
2 − C0 (u2),a n d (22)
G(ul,u h,u 2)=
2u2 (2u2 − uh)
(4u2 − uh)
2 − C0 (u2).













(u2+ul−uh)3 + C00 (u2)












(4u2−uh)3 − C00 (u2)
< 0.
Notice that when the monopolist decides on the utility level of the joint purchase option, it compares
the proﬁts and costs from encouraging joint purchase and decreasing competition (a higher u2)w i t ht h o s e
obtained by saving costs and increasing competition (a lower u2).
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We analyze the monopolist’s decision about how to design diﬀerent versions of a good, i.e. whether it
decides to make them substitutes or complements, when consumers can buy them simultaneously. The
framework of analysis used is a monopoly model with vertical diﬀerentiation, where the monopolist also
sets prices.
In this context, we ﬁnd that versioning goods as substitutes or complements is optimal for the mo-
nopolist because this strategy eliminates the cannibalization eﬀect. Moreover, when the cost function of
making variants complementary is slightly concave or convex, the only equilibrium is when the two vari-
ants are substitutes; and if the cost function is convex enough, we cannot identify whether the monopolist
makes variants substitutes or complements in equilibrium.
Another result is that if variants are very close substitutes, the monopolist oﬀers the high-quality
variant only. In other words, he decides to not create a low-quality variant of an existing good if it is
11a close substitute for the high-quality variant. Otherwise, versioning goods is optimal, independently of
whether variants are substitutes or complements.
We also show that when the diﬀerentiation between variants increases, the monopolist seeks to boost
joint purchase if variants are substitutes, and to save costs if variants are complementary.
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